Back to the rough ground! On Jan Estep's 'Searching for Ludwig Wittgenstein' by Bax, C.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/120116
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
"Beneath the Surface (of Language)" and  "Searching for Ludwig Wittgenstein" introduced by (...) 1 
Transatlantica, 2 | 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
“Back  to the rough ground!” 
On Jan Estep’s “Searching for Ludwig  Wittgenstein” 
Chantal  Bax 
3 Jan Estep’s “Searching for Ludwig Wittgenstein” both has the form and the function of a hiking 
map, though it is also part travel report.2  Estep, who holds a PhD in Philosophy as well as an 
MFA in Fine Arts, devised the map after visiting the site of a hut where philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951) would often retreat to write. Born into a wealthy Viennese family, 
Wittgenstein time and again showed a preference for a more ascetic lifestyle. He famously 
gave away his inheritance and spent significant parts of his life, not in bustling Vienna or in 
intellectual Cambridge (where he was a Fellow and Professor in Philosophy), but in remote 
Austrian villages and the Norwegian countryside. Wittgenstein first visited Norway in 1913, 
when he traveled to the fjords ; impressed with the natural surroundings, he commissioned 
the building of a small cabin near the village of Skjolden. Over the years, Wittgenstein would 
often retreat to his hut, going on long walks and working on manuscripts that would later be 
published as the Philosophical Investigations and Culture and Value, among others. 
4 Estep  travelled  to  the  site  of  Wittgenstein’s  cabin  in  2005,  when  she  was  visiting  the 
Wittgenstein Archives in Bergen. Her exact motives for the trip were unclear to her, as she 
explains in a text placed under an official map of the Skjolden area : “I had a vague hope 
that I would somehow understand Wittgenstein better, but I did not know what to expect or 
what I would find.” In addition to conveying information about Wittgenstein and his hut, the 
text relates Estep’s thoughts and experiences on the trail to the cabin and upon arriving at its 
remains. They are mixed at best, but this precisely makes “Searching for Ludwig Wittgenstein” 
into an interesting project. During the entire expedition Estep has a hard time reconciling what 
she knows and likes about Wittgenstein with what she comes across along the way ; it even 
makes her wonder whether her project is really of a Wittgensteinian nature. Regardless of 
Estep’s doubts, however, her expedition can in fact be explained as being very much in the 
spirit of Wittgenstein, at least as I understand his work. I will come back to this after discussing 
her project in more detail and after explaining the cause of her not being entirely satisfied 
with the trip. 
 
Searching for Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
5 Mixed feelings are already behind Estep’s reason for creating the hiking map in the first place. 
She starts her expedition with a map drawn by Wittgenstein himself, but this map is very 
minimal and Estep cannot completely wrap her head around that fact. Although it is in line 
with Wittgenstein's trust in ordinary, everyday communication, she explains, it seems to sit 
uneasily with is philosophical method more generally : “Here was a man so meticulous in 
his analytic pursuits, yet his directions to the hut were sketchy and vague.” This vagueness 
prompted Estep to devise a more detailed map of her own - out of a desire to make it easier for 
other Wittgensteinians to find the cabin’s site, as Estep herself puts it, but perhaps also out of a 
desire to correct what she sees as Wittgenstein’s very unwittgensteinian representation of the 
route. Her map is printed on the reverse of the side with the official Skjolden area map (where 
Wittgenstein's own drawing is reprinted as well, along with an even more minimal map drawn 
by the owner of a nearby campsite). Estep has also supplemented her drawing with several 
pictures she took during the hike. They are printed alongside her map, with lines connecting 
them to points on the trail. 
6 Estep then goes on to describe her walk to Wittgenstein’s hut. Again, she recounts a mixed 
experience. The route starts out on an unmarked dirt road, crosses a stream and continues 
through a number of muddy fields. Or not so much muddy as covered in manure, Estep points 
out ; the land is still used for farming. But Estep can also appreciate the muckiness of this part 
of the route : “How appropriate that one should have to wade through shit prior to reaching 
any higher state of philosophical understanding.” Once the trail reaches the woods, markings 
left behind by other Wittgensteinians can be discerned, and the route becomes easier to follow. 
Even though her initial reaction to these human signs on a natural trail is one of chagrin, Estep 
finds the red “W” and “TW” markings welcoming and reassuring for invoking “a community 
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of Wittgenstein devotees, each of us on our own but heading in a similar direction.” She also 
enjoys the thought of crossing the same obstacles Wittgenstein himself had to cross in order 
to reach his hut. 
7 Upon arriving at the site of Wittgenstein’s cabin, ambivalence prevails once more. Of the hut, 
only the stone foundation and a cellar remain, but they are becoming more and more overgrown 
by the surrounding vegetation. Estep is also underwhelmed  by the direct surroundings  of 
the hut : “the scenery is generically nice, not spectacular.” To add insult to injury, there is 
nothing to remind visitors of the fact that a brilliant philosopher once called this place his 
(second) home : “There are no markings or commemorative plaques. [...] If I did not know 
who Wittgenstein was, the place would not stand out, just another abandoned relic left to fade 
away in the pretty Norwegian countryside.” 
8 This double consciousness,  as Estep calls it, is a recurring topic in her work. As beings 
endowed with both a mind and a body, we always experience phenomena on two levels : that 
of our visceral, worldly subjectivity and that of our analytical reflection and interpretation. 
In the search for Wittgenstein’s cabin, this duality becomes all too clear, as Estep is unable 
to reconcile her knowledge of and admiration for Wittgenstein with a mostly unexciting 
hike to a plainly unexciting site. While she tries to resolve the tension by reminding herself 
that the non-occurrence of an epiphany at the end of the trail is completely consistent with 
Wittgenstein’s  notion of a failed metaphysics,  her overall experience seems to have been 
one of disappointment. Even if she did not know exactly what to expect from her visit to 
Wittgenstein’s hut, she was apparently not prepared for this anticlimax. 
9 Estep’s anticlimactic feelings are primarily the result of her understanding of Wittgenstein, 
whom  she sees, not so much as a philosopher  in the traditional  sense of the word,  but 
as  a  thinker  whose  main  goal  consists  in  preventing  other  philosophers  from  devising 
intricate theories, or even from devising philosophical theories as such. Estep, in short, takes 
Wittgenstein to be an anti-philosopher. This already becomes clear in the opening section of 
her travel report, in which she quotes Wittgenstein’s famous remark “What is your aim in 
philosophy ? – To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (Philosophical Investigations 
§ 309). Estep is reminded of this quote by the numerous thick and distressing flies she 
encounters on her hike, and she uses this to briefly introduce Wittgenstein’s philosophy (or 
anti-philosophy) to her readers. 
10  “The comment is a direct attack on the myopic ways philosophers can trap themselves in 
their own gnarly problems,” Estep explains. Wittgenstein maintained that many or even most 
philosophical problems arise from a misuse of language. These problems have nothing to do 
with the things themselves, but everything with our speculating about them outside of everyday 
language games. Instead of joining other thinkers in their speculative endeavors, therefore, 
Wittgenstein set out to free philosophers from their self-inflicted confusion. He hoped that “by 
clarifying the navigable landscape of human knowledge, [or] by showing what we can and 
cannot do within philosophy,” the majority of philosophical problems would simply disappear. 
The fly in Wittgenstein’s quote thus stands for the philosopher, the bottle for the problems in 
which he has entangled himself. 
11  Estep’s understanding of Wittgenstein’s method is a widely shared one ; a reading of this kind 
has for instance been defended by the Oxford scholars Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker, whose 
interpretation of Wittgenstein has been highly influential.3   Other interpreters have however 
argued that presenting Wittgenstein as an outright anti-philosopher does not entirely do justice 
to his work. Stanley Cavell has for instance pointed out that Wittgenstein does not think there 
are hard and fast rules as to what counts as an instance of ordinary language, and that he 
accordingly is not trying to lay down what other philosophers can and cannot say.4  There is 
therefore another way of understanding Wittgenstein’s position vis-à-vis philosophy – one 
that may have made Estep’s experience on the Wittgenstein trail less disappointing than the 
reading that in fact informs her project. 
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Interpreting Wittgenstein’s method 
 
12  Wittgenstein’s  method  as it is understood  by interpreters  like Baker and Hacker  can be 
summarized by focusing on one single notion, namely that of essence. It figures in one of 
Wittgenstein’s key methodological remarks : “When philosophers use a word –“knowledge”, 
“being”, “object”, “I”, [...] and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask 
oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original 
home? -- What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical  to their everyday 
use” (Philosophical Investigations [PI] § 116). This is often taken to mean that whereas 
philosophy concerns itself with the nature or essence of things, Wittgenstein will have nothing 
to do with this. Questions about essences solely arise when we detach ourselves from actual 
uses of language, so philosophical problems actually form quasi-problems; there is no such 
thing as “the nature of being” or “the essence of language“ to reflect upon. This also means that 
the solution to philosophical problems is in fact equally simple as effective: they can be solved, 
or more precisely dissolved, by bringing words like “object” and “being” “back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use.” According to a very common reading of Wittgenstein, 
then, he takes philosophy’s preoccupation with essences to be wholly misguided and his own 
method is designed to remove this confusion at its roots. 
13  Another look at Wittgenstein’s methodological remarks, however, reveals that his thoughts on 
the notion of essence are a little less dismissive. He starts what is usually considered to be the 
Investigations’ discourse on method (namely, §§ 89-133) by asking in what sense philosophy 
is something sublime. It after all appears to differ from the sciences, he explains, in not dealing 
with mere “facts of nature” but with the “basis, or essence, of everything empirical” (PI § 89). 
Wittgenstein does not take this to mean that philosophy is a sublime activity – not because 
it does not concern itself with the nature of things, but because this nature or essence should 
not be understood as something sublime or “pure and clear-cut” (PI § 105). For one could 
say, Wittgenstein continues, that “we too in these investigations are trying to understand the 
essence of [things like] language”; its essence in the sense of “its function, its structure,” (PI 
§ 92) to be precise. All too often, however, philosophers work with a different understanding 
of what the nature of something is: “they see in the essence, not something that already lies 
open to view [...] but something that lies beneath the surface.” 
14  Wittgenstein, in other words, does not object to philosophy’s interest in essences as such, 
but more specifically takes issue with a particular conception of what the nature of a thing 
must be: something “of the purest crystal” (PI § 94), immune to “empirical cloudiness or 
uncertainty” (PI § 97). In the grip of this (pre)conception, philosophers traditionally assume 
that even if everyday phenomena are characterized by complexity and ambiguity, the essence 
of these things must be simple and exact, and must accordingly be found somewhere beneath 
or behind the messiness of the everyday. 
15  This, however, is where the traditional philosopher makes a fundamental mistake. “For the 
crystalline purity of logic was [not] a result of investigation,” Wittgenstein points out, “it was a 
requirement” (PI § 107). Instead of enabling philosophers to approach their subject matter with 
an open mind, this requirement limits the outcome of philosophical investigations beforehand. 
It makes philosophers blind to the fact that there is more to meaning than reference, say, or 
that there is more to man than mind. In declaring these things to be the essence of language or 
of human being, philosophers reduce highly complex and multifaceted phenomena to just one 
instance or aspect of them, and can accordingly no longer do justice to the very phenomena 
they set out to explain. Or as Wittgenstein puts it in an analogy that fits well with Estep’s 
hiking project : “We have got on slippery ice where there is no friction, so in a certain sense 
the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk” (PI § 107). 
16  Yet, if philosophers fail to achieve what they set out to do precisely because they are looking 
for simple and sublime essences, there is a solution to their predicament. We want to know the 
nature of things, i.e. “[we] want to walk,” hence, Wittgenstein states, “we need friction” or, in 
other words, we must look for nothing above or beyond the complex and messy phenomena 
as we encounter them in everyday life. It is by giving what Wittgenstein calls a “perspicuous 
representation” of this very complexity that philosophers can contribute to our understanding 
of the nature of things. They need to see that if “our real need” is to understand “the spatial and 
temporal phenomenon of language” or of human being, say, they should not be telling stories 
about “some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm” (PI § 108). Instead, they should help us get 
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an overview of the many different things we count among the uses of language, or among 
the manifestations of mind, as well as of the (family resemblance) relations between these 
different uses and manifestations.5 
 
Reinterpreting “Searching for Ludwig Wittgenstein” 
 
17  To come back to Estep’s project, the mixed feelings she experienced on her hike can all 
be explained in terms of the conception of essence - and thus of the aim and method of 
philosophy - of which Wittgenstein was trying to liberate philosophers (himself included ; 
the Investigations often cite the Tractatus as an example of the way philosophical theory can 
go awry). Take Estep’s disappointment, even before starting the trail, with the sketchy and 
vague directions that make up Wittgenstein’s own map of his hut. Estep takes this to stand in 
contrast with Wittgenstein’s philosophical analyses, but on the reading I have just laid out, it 
is in fact perfectly in line with his understanding of the way philosophers should and should 
not proceed. For if the nature of phenomena like mind and meaning do not come in the form of 
a pure and precise essence, the answer to a philosophical question need take the form of pure 
and precise theory. As Wittgenstein puts it: “If I tell someone “Stand roughly here” – may 
this explanation not work perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too?” (PI § 88). When it 
comes to phenomena like language or human being, an inexact explanation might actually be 
the most viable or precise one, precisely because of their multifaceted nature. 
18  Estep thus need not have been disappointed with Wittgenstein’s map, but Wittgenstein himself 
already anticipated that people might experience his novel approach to philosophy as a bit of a 
letdown : “When we believe that we [...] must find the ideal” beneath or behind everyday 
phenomena, “we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called ‘propositions’ (PI § 105) 
or ‘persons’ or ‘norms’. Just as Estep is underwhelmed by the trail to Wittgenstein’s hut and 
the surroundings of its site, philosophers in the grip of the idea of crystalline purity cannot 
be impressed by mundane instances of language or normativity. They should however occupy 
themselves with nothing more and nothing less than these phenomena in all their everydayness, 
Wittgenstein maintains. For far from being uninteresting, this is exactly where insight into 
their nature can be found : “we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most 
powerful” (PI § 129). 
19  Hence, to reinterpret a last one of Estep’s mixed experiences, it is not appropriate that she had 
to wade trough manure on her way to Wittgenstein’s hut because philosophical understanding 
can, in his view, only be reached by transcending the messiness of the ordinary. That she came 
across these mucky fields is appropriate because philosophy as Wittgenstein sees it does not 
try to rise above messiness and mundaneness. Or as he ends his remark about the slippery ice 
on which philosophers are unable to walk : “Back to the rough ground!” (PI § 107). 
20  Estep, of course, went precisely back to the rough ground, but she all the same feels that she 
did not follow in Wittgenstein’s footsteps in any meaningful sense of the word. According 
to the reading I have just offered, however, there is no reason for Estep to be dissatisfied 
with her expedition, for it was in fact entirely in the spirit of Wittgenstein. He was not so 
much an anti-philosopher as a thinker who wanted philosophy to focus on the ordinary instead 
of the sublime ; that Estep discovered nothing extraordinary on her hike is thus much more 
Wittgensteinian than she seems to realize. In all its mundaneness, Estep’s expedition can 
precisely be said to symbolize philosophy Wittgenstein-style. 
Transarlanti:a.2la:l12 
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Notes 
 
1 Jeffrey Kastner (ed.), Land and Environmental Art, London, Phaidon, 2010. 
2 Jan Estep, Searching for Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lake Eidsvatnet, Skjolden, Sogn, Norway, 2007, 
illustrated folded sheet map, four-color offset print, 32″w x 24″h (unfolded), 3″w x 8″h (folded). The 
essay is also available online at Cultural Geographies, Issue 15, 2008, 255-60, http://cgj.sagepub.com/ 
content/15/2/255.extract and on Estep's website http://www.janestep.com/?page_id=1417. 
3 See e.g. Baker and Hacker, 1985. 
4 See e.g. Cavell, 1962. 
5 This short explanation  still leaves a number  of difficult  questions  about Wittgenstein’s  method 
unaddressed ; in the second chapter of Bax, 2011 I give a more detailed interpretation of PI §§ 89-133. 
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